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THE IRISH INNOCENCE PROJECT 
David Langwallner*† 
It is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.1 
I. ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE IRISH INNOCENCE PROJECT 
The purpose of this Essay is to examine the history, evolution, and 
role of the Irish Innocence Project and to place the project in the milieu 
of the regulatory and social relationships that surround influences and 
impacts upon the project. Thus, it is proposed also to examine the Irish 
legal framework both constitutional, rights driven, statutory, and case 
law that either assists or hampers the project as well as canvass 
prospective legal issues affecting the Irish Innocence project. Of course 
it will also be necessary to refer to stakeholders in the Irish system, and 
in this context the Essay will refer in detail to the Irish Police called the 
Gardaí (sic Gaelic) as well as the role of the Irish state and government 
and finally the prison service in the way they impact upon the project. 
The purpose is to provide as full a picture as possible of the Irish project 
at this stage of its evolution. 
The Irish project was set up in September 20092 at Griffith College 
Dublin. The idea for the project resulted from a suggestion made to the 
present author. I had been teaching clinical legal education at The Kings 
Inns, the sole present training school for barristers, in Ireland for a 
period of 5 years when I was appointed Dean of Griffith College Law 
faculty.3 In this context, I was asked as to how the school might enhance 
 
 * David Langwallner is a constitutional and public law barrister who has also litigated several 
criminal defence cases. He is a practising Irish Barrister and member of Field Court Chambers in Grays 
Inns, London. He is a graduate of Trinity College Dublin, Harvard Law School and the London School 
of Economics and is also Dean of Griffith College Law School and Lecturer in Constitutional Law and 
Jurisprudence at The Kings Inns. He is the Director of the Irish Innocence Project. I would like to thank 
Edward Mathews LLB and Steve O Donoghue LLB for their assistance with respect to aspects of this 
document. Needless to say all infelicities of style and content are at my doorstep. 
 † This article is being published as part of a symposium that took place in April 2011 in 
Cincinnati, Ohio, hosted by the Ohio Innocence Project, entitled The 2011 Innocence Network 
Conference: An International Exploration of Wrongful Conviction. Funding for the symposium was 
provided by The Murray and Agnes Seasongood Good Government Foundation. The articles appearing 
in this symposium range from formal law review style articles to transcripts of speeches that were given 
by the author at the symposium. Therefore, the articles published in this symposium may not comply 
with all standards set forth in Texas Law Review and the Bluebook. 
 1. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 352 (1769). 
 2. Though I initially proposed it significantly earlier and a detailed proposal document was 
finalised in June of that year. 
 3. Griffith College is Ireland’s largest private college and the college provides, inter alia, 
primary and master’s degrees in law. In recent years many graduates of the college have become 
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the clinical component in the teaching of law. I should also add that the 
genesis of the project also stemmed from the fact that I am a practicing 
constitutional and human rights barrister and have always been very 
interested in human rights and criminal justice issues with a historic 
background also as a criminal defense lawyer. I have also litigated 
several major constitutional actions. It goes without saying that I was 
very aware of the project being established in the U.S. in 1992 by Barry 
Scheck and Peter Neufeld, though I was not aware in any detail of the 
Innocence Network at the inception of the Irish Innocence Project.4 
I made a number of suggestions, most of which have been 
incorporated in the teaching of various subjects on the syllabus, but one 
suggestion resulted in a very detailed document being drafted suggesting 
that an Innocence Project be started in Ireland with the assistance of the 
college. The overall perspective was that the project would achieve two 
salutary and interlocking ends, which, in order of priority, are (1) help 
free innocence people that are either current prisoners or have been 
released from prison,5 and (2) inculcate in students clinical skills in a 
way which made learning law interesting and personally rewarding.6 
I might add that I now believe that a third worthwhile, and vitally 
important, skill can be derived, that is developing a human rights 
consciousness and a passion for justice, necessary perspectives in my 
view in an increasingly commercial and business driven legal culture, 
both nationally and internationally.  
The college was supportive and agreed to provide, among other 
things, rooms7 and conference facilities, which have been useful. There 
was a wellspring of interest among the student fraternity, and it must be 
added that we were significantly helped by other projects in the setting 
up period.8 We enlisted the aid of, initially, two supervising criminal 
 
successful barristers and solicitors, among other things. Some of those have assisted the development of 
the project. 
 4. Though, of course now the Irish project is privileged to be associated with, in effect, an 
increasingly worldwide human rights movement. 
 5. The second category of former inmates evolved organically as the project had no conception 
in advance that it would be contacted by released prisoners who felt hugely aggrieved. These were 
people largely not motivated by compensation considerations, but out of a visceral desire to clear their 
name for the monstrous injustice that was perpetrated upon them. It should be added that it is also the 
case that supporters and relatives of deceased former prisoners anxious to clear their name have also 
contacted the project. 
 6. In parenthesis it should be noted as to how difficult in many respects it is to make certain 
clinical skills interesting. Anyone who has had to teach legal drafting will attest to that fact! 
 7. Including a secure locked room with a confidential code for the storage of files! 
 8. Everybody who helped is thanked, but particular gratitude goes to Dr Greg Hampikian of the 
Idaho Project, formerly of the Atlanta project, for his enormous assistance in April 2009 when the 
project had been active for a few months and the hugely useful support he provided in streamlining and 
customising our documentation and structures. We embraced many of his suggestions for improvement. 
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defense barristers who have become a mainstay of the project.9 It might 
be added that, in the four years since, that number of supervising 
lawyers has risen now to eight. 
There was a significant amount of initial interest after careful and 
select publicizing of the project,10 and we attracted cases very quickly. It 
was very discernible, borrowing a vernacular expression and one also 
used in the law of patent, that we were filling a “long felt want” in 
Ireland. Since the inception of the project, at various stages, upwards of 
60 people have contacted us. As I write, (May 2013) there are some 20 
active files. 
The project has 12 student case workers drawn now from Trinity, 
Dublin City University and Griffith College. Such students are carefully 
selected after a rigorous interview process where many factors are borne 
in mind and form part of the interview panel’s deliberations. It would be 
too time consuming to mention all the factors we consider, but the two 
we have found particularly helpful are, firstly, the importance of a 
human rights commitment, evidenced by a commitment to public 
service or voluntary work, and, secondly, the display of soft skills. It 
must be stressed in this later context that we have found it is not 
necessarily the best academic student who makes the best student 
caseworker, but the student with the most significant amount of soft 
skills. 
Initially, such caseworkers were drawn exclusively from Griffith 
College’s daytime and night-time students, but in September 2010, the 
project, at my suggestion, sought to involve students of other 
institutions. The Dean of Trinity College Dublin, Dr Hilary Delaney, 
was extremely helpful and supportive, and there are now four students 
who come from Trinity College Dublin who are caseworkers on the 
project.11 More recently, Dublin City University students participate in 
the project and contribute two caseworkers. Other institutions in the 
light of recent talks I have had will, in all probability, come on board in 
fall 2013. My aim and aspiration, which appears as though it will be 
fulfilled, is to make the project a national, united one composed of 
different institutional stakeholders though recognizing the support 
Griffith College has given it. 
It should be added that a full time Trinity academic, David 
Prendergast, was appointed as a supervising lawyer on the project and is 
the direct point of contact for the Trinity intake of students.  
 
 9. Elaine Finneran BL and Barry Glynn BL. 
 10. The media in Ireland, as I suspect in most countries, is an unruly horse to ride but we had 
very favourable coverage from Ireland’s paper of record, The Irish Times. 
 11. It would be remiss of me not to thank my colleague and friend Dr Oran Doyle of Trinity who 
was very helpful in assisting the project in its initial stages. 
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There is one final layer of the project that needs to be mentioned apart 
from caseworkers, supervising lawyers, students, and indeed me as 
Director, and that is the supervisory board of the project. The 
supervisory board arose as a result of a suggestion by Dr Greg 
Hampikian, which was acted upon. Greg’s idea had to be tailored to an 
Irish context and, in effect, I set up a board to advise and counsel the 
project, which has had several substantial meetings thus far. The Board 
is chaired by a judge of the Irish Supreme Court12 and different 
stakeholders in the legal system are also represented—civil rights 
activists, criminal defense lawyers, professional representatives, 
including a former chairman of the law society, and noted academics in 
the field. The board in particular has provided excellent advice 
including, but not limited to, the question of case progression and the 
decision taken to progress one particular case back before the Irish 
courts of which I will say more later. 
Finally, the project has a rotating administrator. We have highly 
detailed procedures and documents in place for dealing with 
correspondence and a detailed and, recently revamped, questionnaire. 
A. A Brief Synopsis of Project Procedures 
It might be useful at this juncture to indicate briefly our processes. 
After an initial contact and acknowledgement, the aforementioned 
questionnaire is sent out to the client. Once that level of correspondence 
is received back, a desk top review of the case is conducted for the 
purposes of determining its admissibility with our criteria. At this stage 
in the process, several applications have historically been filtered and 
determined to be inadmissible. 
Consider the following examples: 
1: A client who does not state in the clearest terms in response to 
questions on the questionnaire that he is factually innocent. We have had 
several people contact the project complaining about many things in the 
conduct of their trial including what is termed in the U.S. ineffective 
assistance of counsel but simply do not state or indicate in the 
questionnaire that they are factually innocent. We invariably wrote back 
several times to the prisoner to clarify whether he or she is factually 
innocent or not before a file is closed. 
2: We have had contact with several people who, although they 
accept that they did the act and, thus, are guilty of manslaughter, did not, 
for whatever reasons, have the requisite intent for murder. We have had 
 
 12. The second highest court in Ireland and an appellate court, I suspect the nearest U.S. analogy 
would be the Circuit Court of Appeals. The judge in question, who is also judge in residence at Griffith 
College and who has been enormously helpful, is Mr Justice Frank Clark. 
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a lively discussion in respect to such cases, a discussion I understand is 
mirrored by other innocence projects, and have decided not to accept 
such cases, subject to one caveat. We have decided that where the lesser 
offence, in our judgment, is not connected to the offense(s) for which 
factual innocence is claimed to accept the case.  
3: We obviously have to be selective and filter out cases we 
regretfully conclude we cannot progress. 
After the desk top review takes place, the supervising lawyer and 
caseworkers involved in the process report back to a plenary meeting of 
the project.13 At that stage, a general discussion takes place of the case. 
Caseworkers and lawyers are assigned and the process of the collection 
of evidence ensues, which in practice often means the procuring of the 
case file and all relevant transcripts. The project has found by 
experience that it might be necessary, around this time, to send a letter 
to the Irish police or to the Garda for the preservation of all relevant 
evidence. 
After all the relevant evidence is procured or as much as can 
realistically be procured, which may be an arduous process as we shall 
see in the next Subpart, the object of the exercise is to prepare a final 
report and if necessary an expert report which will be handed back to the 
client. As we shall see in the next Part this is necessary because of the 
ethical vagaries of the Irish system. 
B. Uniquely Irish Obstacles and Other Objections to an  
Innocence Project 
Although the project developed a momentum and support, which it 
has sustained, very quickly there were various objections from what is a 
conservative, putting it kindly, legal community.  
In this context it might be noted that Ireland is a divided profession 
between barristers and solicitors. A barrister is, in effect and in ideal, a 
specialist and court room lawyer. A solicitor, in contrast, deals more 
directly with the public and handles non-litigious matters. Though the 
distinction, whether viable or not, has become somewhat blurred in 
recent years with inter alia solicitors advocating at the higher level of the 
court system. There are significant and imminent reforms as I write 
afoot in the Irish legal system. 
Effectively there were various muted objections. One issue which the 
project has addressed is that barristers, in most instances, cannot 
 
 13. I should perhaps have mentioned it earlier in the paper that there is a plenary meeting of the 
projects every two weeks where all caseworkers, directors, and supervising lawyers are expected to be 
present and common substantive issues are discussed. On occasion, outside agencies such as forensics 
experts will be asked to give submissions to the project at this meeting. 
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ethically be involved in attempting to generate work from direct access 
to the client, a practice inelegantly and restrictively called touting.14 In 
this context, we determined that since several barristers were involved in 
the project, once the file was complete and provided a final report, 
including an expert report if necessary, the report is then sent to the 
client who contacted the project.  If necessary, the report should contain 
a detailed summary of reasons as to why, in our view, a solicitor of the 
clients’ choosing could be contacted to brief a barrister to bring the 
matter back into court.15 
In this fashion, the project is providing only a backup or investigative 
service to a post-conviction prisoner the system has disposed with. Once 
that service is provided, to bring the case back into the system, the client 
must go back to the solicitor in order to brief a barrister. To an 
American ear, and indeed to many others, this may seem maddeningly 
tortuous, but the process is arguably necessary given Irish professional 
ethical restrictions and the need to assuage the sensitivities of those of a 
conservative disposition in their interpretation of professional ethics.16 
In full fairness, it should be added that many sensible people accepted 
that there was no ethical quandary in providing pro bono legal support to 
those who have, in some sense, been disposed of by the legal process. 
Indeed, many enlightened people in the Irish bar in particular welcomed 
the project and saw it as an addition to the Irish legal firmament. Indeed 
the support among barristers in particular has been deeply gratifying. 
It should be noted that there is a wind of change in the Irish legal 
profession as I write and a new legal regulatory bill being prepared. It is 
hoped that such reforms and a changes to the legal climate will make it 
easier for the project to assume representative work but, of course, there 
will always be a need for close contact with solicitors and barristers who 
give up their time, pro bono, for the public interest. 
A further issue which has taken until recent months to resolve and 
still, to some small extent, affects the project is the cooperation of the 
client’s former, or in some instances present, solicitors. In essence the 
project needs access to a full set of trial and pretrial documents, the file 
in short, and the file is often in the possession of the solicitor or former 
solicitor. However, a very small minority of solicitors have refused to 
cooperate and have been, in some instances, either avowedly critical or 
 
 14. Whether this is a permissible restriction in this day and age is not the subject of this paper, 
and I leave it for others to judge. It is certainly, it seems to me, alien to an American sensibility. 
 15. We will examine the court procedure in the next Part. 
 16. The conservative nature at times of the Irish profession was best illustrated by a conversation 
I had with an esteemed colleague who, when discussing the project with me, prefaced his remarks as to 
the ethical problems the project faced with the somewhat startling assurance that “Of course we were 
doing nothing illegal.” In another instance, one lawyer bizarrely suggested that the project may be 
incompatible with decisions of the Irish Supreme Court! 
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suspicious or both of the project. There is no justification, legal or 
otherwise, for a solicitor to not hand over the file, the file is the property 
of the client, not the solicitor. Mercifully, these difficulties, which were 
on occasion time consuming, have been resolved or overcome. The 
project no longer faces effective hostility in this respect and as the 
project further beds down any outstanding residual issues, it is hoped 
that these issues will be resolved. 
It must be stressed that many, indeed an overwhelming number of 
solicitors, have been very helpful in handing over the file to us and 
ordering the papers and paginating documents. Further, solicitor firms 
have increasingly accepted project caseworkers on paid internships. 
Another issue, important in Ireland, was the question of stakeholder 
acceptance. We had meetings with the past and current Minister for 
Justice informing them as to the raison d’être of the project. This was 
deemed particularly necessary in securing access to prisoners in a proper 
professional legal environment, rather than generic public access. The 
Irish Ministry for Justice, after several meetings were very supportive 
and now Innocence prison visits are given the same status, in effect, as 
ordinary legal visits. The government has a civil servant processing 
Innocence project prison visit requests.17 
A further ethical issue then arose which we needed to resolve. If we 
could have prison visits, could a barrister attend unaccompanied by a 
solicitor? In effect, the concern was that the bar code of conduct seemed 
to preclude a prison visit by a barrister without the accompaniment of a 
solicitor. Some of us took the view that all the code of conduct stated 
was that a visit in the professional representative capacity qua barrister 
could not take place without a solicitor. That prohibition did not apply to 
an innocence project visit which was supervisory for the barrister and 
educational for the student. Nonetheless, it was believed desirable that 
the advice of the bar council be sought informally. This was done and, 
after some hesitation, the practice of supervisory barristers attending 
prison visits was cleared; though I understand with the proviso that 
those barristers going on the visit cannot subsequently represent that 
person in court.18 
A further issue in general was the cooperation of the prisons. Some 
prison governors were supportive and after the Minister allowed access, 
their support grew; though there were some minor glitches in the initial 
stages of the project, prison visits in particular, including, at times, some 
 
 17. It must be stressed that the decision to visit a prisoner is not an automatic one and the project 
discusses the matter in detail as to whether a visit is necessary in a particular case. It is also 
comparatively recent as files have to be processed and researched and initial reports submitted.  
 18. I assume this is the prohibition on a barrister generating his own work as already mentioned 
though, again, it seems maddeningly tortuous. 
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confusion as to who precisely we were. At one stage, clarification had to 
be sought before a perplexed prison official reluctantly granted 
admission for a visit! 
In this context, it must be stressed that after I addressed the prison 
librarians’ annual conference the prison librarians volunteered their 
support for the following: 
(i): The Irish Innocence Project information material in poster form to be 
put up on the prison notice board. 
(ii): That prisoners, if they request, are referred to the project or supplied 
with our details. 
(iii): With the co-operation of Griffith College, that legal materials and 
texts be supplied to the prison librarians if they so request, same for the 
prisoners. 
A final crucial issue concerns the Irish Police or Garda. I was 
involved in an extensive process of lobbying the Commissioner of the 
Garda for a ruling on whether we could gain access to material they 
preserve and independently test. Eventually, after much delay and many 
months, the Commissioner, after an ostensible consultative process, 
refused our request and indicated if we were to make such an application 
to preserve and ab extensor, test we would have to do so within the 
framework of an application under the Criminal Procedure Act,19 which 
I will momentarily turn to. This refusal, though anticipated, had a certain 
chicken and egg quality; how can you go back for an application under 
the Criminal Procedure Act that there has been a miscarriage of justice if 
you do not have the results of the test? However, we have found a way 
around this conundrum, which will be further discussed, but, first, let us 
turn substantively to the miscarriage of justice procedures in our law. 
C. Miscarriages of Justice: The Statutory Framework and Principles 
from the Case Law 
1. Statutory Framework and the Criminal Procedure Act 
The ultimate purpose and work of the Irish Innocence Project is, of 
course, to exonerate a serving or former prisoner from a crime they did 
not commit. In this respect, if the prisoner is a serving prisoner, then the 
ultimate endgame of the Irish project is to provide a report to the client 
who, armed with that report, consults a solicitor of his choice with a 
view to bringing the matter back before the Court of Criminal Appeal 
under the miscarriage of justice procedure. Thus, the legislative scheme 
 
 19. Which deals, as we shall see, with miscarriages of justice. 
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under the Irish Criminal Procedure Act 1993 is appropriate and needs to 
be discussed in detail. 
The starting point is the Criminal Procedure Act and, in particular, 
section 2. 
From this, it can be appreciated that the engine which propels the 
Criminal Procedure Act and triggers its application is the production of 
a new or newly discovered fact which demonstrates that there has been a 
miscarriage of justice.  
Further, it is pellucid from the defined terms of the Criminal 
Procedure Act that a new fact is a fact known to the convicted person at 
the time of the trial or appeal proceedings, the significance of which was 
appreciated by him, where he alleges a reasonable explanation for his 
failure to adduce evidence of that fact.20 In contrast, a newly discovered 
fact is a fact discovered by or coming to the notice of the convicted 
person after the relevant appeal proceedings have been finally 
determined or a fact whose significance was not appreciated by the 
convicted person or his advisors during the trial or appeal proceedings.21 
The act provides that: 
A person 
(a) who has been convicted of an offence either— 
(i) on indictment, or 
(ii) after signing a plea of guilty and being sent forward for sentence 
under section 13(2)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1967, and who, 
after appeal to the Court including an application for leave to appeal, and 
any subsequent re-trial, stands convicted of an offence to which this 
paragraph applies, and 
(b) who alleges that a new or newly-discovered fact shows that there has 
been a miscarriage of justice in relation to the conviction or that the 
sentence imposed is excessive, may, if no further proceedings are 
pending in relation to the appeal, apply to the Court for an order quashing 
the conviction or reviewing the sentence. 
Thus, the lynchpin of the legislation is that the person claiming to be 
a victim of a miscarriage of justice has to adduce (and the burden of 
proof on the balance of probabilities is firmly on the alleged victim of 
the miscarriage of justice) that a new or newly discovered fact shows 
that there has been a miscarriage. 
Section 3(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act is also of relevance, it 
 
 20. Criminal Procedure Act 1993, § 2(3) (Act No. 40/1993) (Ir.), available at 
http://www.bailii.org/ie/legis/num_act/1993/0040.html#zza40y1993s2. 
 21. Criminal Procedure Act 1993, § 2(4) (Act No. 40/1993) (Ir.), available at 
http://www.bailii.org/ie/legis/num_act/1993/0040.html#zza40y1993s2. 
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provides that on the hearing of an appeal against conviction of an 
offence, the Court of Criminal Appeal (C.C.A.) may take the following 
actions: 
(a) affirm the conviction (and may do so, notwithstanding that it is of 
opinion that a point raised in the appeal might be decided in favor of the 
appellant, if it considers that no miscarriage of justice has actually 
occurred), or 
(b) quash the conviction and make no further order, or 
(c) quash the conviction and order the applicant to be re-tried for the 
offence, or 
(d) quash the conviction and, if it appears to the Court that the appellant 
could have been found guilty of some other offence [substitute a 
conviction for the lesser offence and sentence accordingly]. 
Further, section 7 of the Criminal Procedure Act concerns a petition 
to the Minister for Justice for a pardon under Article 13.6 of the 
Constitution and again invokes the driver of section 2 in that the 
applicant has to adduce a new or newly discovered fact to demonstrate 
that a miscarriage of justice has occurred in relation to the conviction. If 
the Minister then is of the opinion, after making inquiries, that either no 
miscarriage has been shown and no useful purpose would be served by 
further investigation or, disjunctively, that the matters dealt with by 
petition could be more appropriately dealt with by way of application to 
the Court pursuant to section 2, the Minister is obligated to inform the 
petitioner and take no further action. If, however, he thinks differently, 
he shall recommend to the government that either the President grant a 
pardon or, pursuant to section 8 of the Criminal Procedure Act, a 
Committee should be ordered to inquire into and report on the case. 
It should be stressed that recently the Irish Innocence Project has 
asked the Minister for Justice for a pardon in a matter and the Minister is 
actively considering our detailed submissions in this respect. 
Section 9 of the Act is also relevant and it was recently considered in 
the case of People (D.P.P.) v. Hannon.22 The crux of section 9 is the 
payment of compensation. The section stipulates that where a conviction 
has been quashed, where someone has been acquitted on retrial and the 
court has certified that a newly discovered fact shows there has been a 
miscarriage of justice, or, lastly, where there has been a pardon and the 
Minister is satisfied there has been a miscarriage of justice, the Minister 
shall pay compensation to the convicted person, or, if dead, to his legal 
 
 22. See D.P.P. v. Hannon, [2009] I.E.C.C.A. 43 (Ir.). It might be noted that many of the cases 
involve a myriad of different applications to the C.C.A. and Supreme Court. The cases often have many 
hearings: a court of criminal hearing under Section 2, a hearing on whether a point of law of exceptional 
public importance is involved, a Supreme Court hearing, and further applications. 
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personal representatives, unless the non-disclosure of the fact in time is 
wholly or partly attributable to the convicted person. It might be noted 
that a person has the alternative option of suing for damages. The 
quantum of compensation ordered by the Minister can be appealed to 
the High Court. 
Finally, it might be noted that one other statutory provision is 
particularly important flowing from the case law and that is section 29 
of the Courts of Justice Act 1924 which regulates the right of appeal 
from the C.C.A. to the Supreme Court. It states, in essence, that in order 
for there to be an appeal from the C.C.A. to the Supreme Court, the 
C.C.A. or the Attorney General must certify that a case involves an issue 
of law of exceptional public performance and that it is in the public 
interest that an appeal be taken by the Supreme Court. Under such 
certifications, an appeal may be brought to the Supreme Court, the 
decision of which shall be final and conclusive. 
This statutory scheme creates, as indicated, the endgame of the 
project. In essence, the project wants to establish that a new or newly 
discovered fact, whether that be a recanted confession or a new DNA 
test, that was not invoked at the original trial establishes a miscarriage of 
justice on the basis of factual innocence.23 
It is now necessary, briefly, to deal with the case law on this Act and 
the principles to emerge there from. 
2. Case Law 
There is a detailed jurisprudence on miscarriages of justice which I do 
not have space to go into. In essence the following principles can be 
derived from the case law with reference to appropriate authorities. The 
following points are the crux of how, in fact, the Irish courts interpret 
miscarriage applications under the Act.24 
1: That the burden of proof, on the balance of probabilities, is on the 
applicant to show there has been a miscarriage of justice. The burden of 
proof on the applicant is to establish, as matter of probability, not 
possibility, that the newly discovered facts would have led to an 
acquittal.25 
2: That the applicant need not establish that a miscarriage of justice has 
actually occurred before proceeding to quash the conviction.26 
3: That the Act operates to provide redress in cases where facts come to 
 
 23. It might be noted, as indicated, that the Act also provides a procedure for compensation. 
 24. I have tried to include them in a form of logical order as they might arise to a judge. 
 25. D.P.P. v. Pringle, [1995] 2 I.R. 547, aff’d, [1997] 2 I.R. 225. 
 26. D.P.P. v. Nevin, [2010] I.E.C.C.A. 106 (Ir.). 
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light for the first time after an appeal, which show that there may have 
been a miscarriage of justice.27 
4: That s.2 provides redress to an applicant who can point to material 
which, if it had been available at the trial might—not necessarily 
would—have raised a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury.28 
5: It is up to the court to conduct an objective evaluation of a newly 
discovered fact to determine inter alia whether there has been a 
miscarriage of justice. In the Kelly litigation, Kearns, J. blends the 
criteria for the reception of fresh evidence on appeal with the criteria for 
the reception of new or newly discovered evidence on a miscarriage of 
justice application. In essence, the learned judge indicates that the court 
must engage with and evaluate the new evidence to determine whether it 
would materially affect the decision reached. Was the evidence credible, 
material and important and would it influence the outcome of the case? 
The judge indicates that the concept of materiality is read in reference to 
evidence adduced at the trial and not in isolation and such evidence has to 
show that it would genuinely enable the defense to raise a doubt such as 
to render the conviction unsafe.29 
7: That in order to constitute a fact for the purposes of the application for 
miscarriage, the fact must be one which was relevant to the trial itself and 
to the decision made by the trial court and must imply that it is a fact 
which would have been admissible and relevant in evidence in the trial.30 
8: That it does not follow because a conviction has been quashed that a 
certificate of a miscarriage of justice should issue.31 
9: That the term miscarriage of justice is of wider import than factual 
innocence and connotes inter alia the following: 
(i): Where it is established that the applicant was innocent of the crime 
alleged, Hannon32 establishes that, in a recantation case, where there has 
been no untoward state conduct, the applicant is always entitled to a 
certificate and compensation. A miscarriage of justice is always made out 
on the basis of factual innocence. 
(ii): Where a prosecution should never have been brought in the sense 
that there was never any credible evidence implicating the applicant. 
(iii): Where there has been such a departure from the rules which 
permeate all judicial procedures as to make that which happened 
altogether irreconcilable with judicial or constitutional procedure. 
 
 27. Id. at 109. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See D.P.P. v. Kelly, [2009] IECCA 56 (Ir.). 
 30. Pringle, [1995] 2 I.R. 547, 552. 
 31. D.P.P. v. Meleady & Grogan, [2001] 4 I.R. 16 (Ir.). 
 32. See Hannon, [2009] I.E.C.C.A. 43 (Ir.). 
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(iv): Where there has been a grave defect in the administration of justice, 
brought about by agents of the State.33 
10: Whether there is a miscarriage or the conviction is unsafe and 
unsatisfactory cannot be determined by the course taken by the defense at 
trial. The questions would be how strategically the defense would have 
been altered.34 
Thus, as far as the Irish Innocence Project is concerned, the applicant 
needs to show that he may have been a victim of miscarriage of justice 
on new or newly discovered evidence that is relevant and admissible. It 
should be stressed that the term miscarriage of justice, both under the 
Act and in general, is wider than mere factual innocence. For instance, 
there can be a miscarriage of justice if a conviction is deemed unsafe. 
The Irish project takes the view that it can examine other matters that 
may amount to a miscarriage, such as to render the conviction unsafe, 
and that might involve technical legal issues as long as the prisoner 
assures us and we accept that he or she is factually innocent.35 
It should be stressed that all of these statutory and case law principles 
are to some extent linked with a rights driven and, in particular, 
constitutional overlay to which I now turn. 
D. The Irish Constitution and Rights Considerations 
As well as the miscarriage of justice procedures and cases considered 
above, the work of Innocence Projects is intimately linked to rights 
driven considerations either directly or indirectly. To some extent, such 
rights driven considerations influence the courts in miscarriages of 
justice applications in Ireland and, in particular, the due process clause 
of the Irish Constitution Article 38.1.36 However, there is a general 
constitutional overlay in the work of projects in terms of the access to 
evidence and, of course, the access to testing. I propose to deal with all 
these issues in the following section. 
As far as human rights protection in Ireland is concerned, I think it 
necessary to first understand the relationship between international 
instruments and the domestic Irish Constitution which color and 
influence our reception of human rights law. Thus, I propose to deal 
with the relationship between the Irish Constitution and The European 
Convention on Human Rights. I also propose at times to relate the 
 
 33. D.P.P. v. Wall, [2005] I.E.C.C.A. 140, 142 (Ir.). 
 34. The first statement is contained in People D.P.P v. Gannon, [1997] 1 I.R. 40, 47. 
 35. Such as a fundamental failure of due process which is dealt with in the next Part. 
 36. IR. CONST., 1937, art. 38(1) (“No person shall be tried on any criminal charge save in due 
course of law.”). In these simple words the courts have established a multitude of emanations of due 
process which are discussed in detail in the text. 
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material to a U.S. Constitutional culture to show agreement and at times 
doctrinal dissonance between the two cultures. 
1. Bunreacht Na HÉireann 
The Irish Constitution (or in the Gaelic, Bunreacht Na HÉireann) 
dates from 1937, though there was an earlier 1922 document. The 
constitutional structure, similar to the U.S. Constitution and Bill of 
Rights, provides for a system of judicial review and various rights 
driven clauses that judges derive either textually from the document or 
have read into the document (the so called unspecified rights is also an 
aspect of U.S. Constitutional culture as I understand it and is referred to 
as the unenumerated rights).37 The crucial rights clauses are Article 40–
45 and Article 38.38 It must be noted that many of those articles which 
we shall look at deal with human rights issues that affect Innocence 
Projects. In short, we cannot assess from an Irish perspective the role 
and functions of the Irish Innocence Project without assessing the 
relevant constitutional stipulations. 
As indicated, where relevant, I will also try and translate Irish 
Constitutional considerations into U.S. Constitutional terms and cite 
analogous case law. 
2. The European Convention on Human Rights 
It must also be noted that Ireland is a signatory to the European 
Convention on Human Rights, a comprehensive human rights charter.39 
In 2003, the convention became part of our domestic law. It is now 
possible to take proceedings in the Irish Courts alleging a breach of the 
Convention.40 However, the Convention has been incorporated in an 
impoverished and indirect manner. It sits somewhere below 
Constitutional rights and in the event of a conflict between the two, the 
Constitution prevails. To many this is a sub-constitutional level of 
 
 37. A terminology also used in an Irish constitutional context. 
 38. See IR. CONST., 1937. Among the more important rights, Article 38 deals with trial in due 
course of law/due process; crucial for innocence project, Article 40.1—Equality; Article 40.3—life, as 
well as the clause where the unspecified rights are grafted onto the Constitution; Article 40.4—Liberty; 
Article 40.6—Expression, Association and Assembly; Article 41—Family Rights; Article 42—
Education rights; Article 43—Property rights; and Article 44—Religion. 
 39. Id. Crucial clauses include Article 40—the right to life; Article 3—the prohibition against 
torture and inhumane and degrading treatment; Article 5—liberty; Article 6—fair trial, arguably the 
crucial clause as far as innocence projects are concerned; Article 8—privacy and family life; Article 9—
Religion; and Article 10—expression. 
 40. It is of course, as we shall see, still also possible to take an Irish case after you have 
exhausted all local remedies to the European Court of Human Rights. 
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incorporation. Further, the incorporation is not retrospective41 and some 
judges have hinted that it sits no higher than ordinary legislation.42 
In practical terms, the result of incorporation is that advocates can 
raise Convention case law domestically and some, but not all, Irish 
judges will mold the constitutional case law in accordance with 
Convention cases, though the Irish Supreme Court is not necessarily 
supportive of this practice. In practice, I have had, when citing 
Convention case law, substantially different reactions from Irish judges. 
Some sympathetic, some not so sympathetic. The facility whereby an 
Irish judge can shape Irish constitutional law in accordance with 
Convention criteria has been termed the interpretative obligation.43 
Further, an Irish court can also declare Irish law to be incompatible 
with the Convention, though this approach is toothless in that the 
incompatible provision of Irish law still stands.44 Ireland also recognizes 
the right of individual petition to the Convention and interstate 
applications so an individual or state can take Ireland to the European 
Court of Human Rights.  In this capacity, there have been several 
instances of Ireland being found in breach of the convention, some of 
which we will refer to. The practice of the Irish government in general 
terms is to invariably alter (often after a delay) Irish law if it is found by 
the European Court of Human Right to be in breach. 
The Act incorporating the Convention into our domestic law is short 
and comprises only nine sections with the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (and protocols thereto) fully 
contained in five schedules at the end of the Act.45 
Under section 2 of the Act, courts are obliged to interpret Irish law in 
a manner compatible with the Convention “in so far as possible.” This 
 
 41. See Cosma v. Minister for Justice Equality & Law Reform, [2006] I.E.S.C. (Ir.). I litigated a 
case which, to some extent, turned on the fact that the proceedings had been instituted (well before the 
hearing date) prior to the incorporation of The European Convention into domestic law. The judge thus 
took a markedly different approach and, from our point of view, negative approach to the relevance and 
applicability of Convention case law. 
 42. See McD v. L, [2007] I.E.S.C. 81 (Ir.) (demonstrating unequivocally and in a hugely 
unappealing and unappetising manner, the restrictive attitude of the Irish courts towards the 
interpretation of the convention). 
 43. See McD v. L, [2007] I.E.S.C. 81 (Ir.). In refusing to follow convention case law under 
Article 8 recognising the unmarried father and family, the Chief Justice reiterated that Ireland was a 
dualist state and indicated that the so called interpretative obligation under Section 2 of the European 
Convention Act 2003 does not allow for autonomous claims based purely on the Convention. 
 44. See Foy v. An t-ArdChláraitheoir&Ors, [2007] I.E.H.C. 470 (Ir.). A declaration of 
incompatibility issues, but the provision of Irish law stands most cogently illustrated in this case where, 
inter alia, McKechnie, J., found that the Irish practice of refusing to allow transsexuals the right to 
change their birth registrar violated Article 8 of the Convention, but the learned judge did not, as he 
could not, strike down the provision of Irish law. 
 45. European Convention on Human Rights (Act No. 20/2003) (Ir.), available at 
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2003/en/act/pub/0020/index.html. 
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has been termed, as aforementioned, an interpretative obligation but the 
structure of the section seems to suggest that a clearly conflicting 
provision of Irish law trumps the convention. 
Under section 3, every “organ of the State” (meaning every organ of 
the State other than the courts, President and the Oireachtas) is required 
to perform its functions in a manner compatible with the ECHR and can 
be sued if it fails to comply with Convention obligations. 
Courts must, under section 4 of the Act, take “judicial notice” of the 
Convention and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights 
(Strasbourg) and the European Commission on Human Rights. In effect, 
they are obliged to consider and take into account decisions of the 
ECHR, but are not bound in any fashion to follow them. 
Under Section 5a, “declaration of incompatibility” of Irish law with 
the ECHR can be made by the High Court or Supreme Court. Such 
declarations can be accompanied by an award of damages. However, 
this remedy is available only if no other legal remedy is “adequate or 
available.” The effect of a declaration of incompatibility is merely that 
the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) or appropriate government minister lays 
(presents and mentions) the decision before the Dail (the main house of 
parliament). No new vote on the legislation is required and the 
legislation is still valid unless it has separately been declared 
unconstitutional. 
Thus, baldly stated, there are two routes available if a litigant wants to 
invoke the Convention: 
1: The Domestic Route: Ask an Irish Court to mould Irish Law in 
accordance with the Convention or declare an act incompatible with the 
Convention or sue a state body for a convention breach. 
2: The International Route: Exhaust all remedies in the Irish courts and 
go to the European Court itself in Strasbourg, though that may take 
upwards of 5 years. 
Ireland has also signed other human rights instruments such as the 
United Nations Civil and Political Covenant and recognizes the right of 
individual petition to the Human Rights Committee but has not 
incorporated the covenant into our domestic law. There have been 
instances where Ireland has been taken to the human rights committee of 
experts.46 
 
 46. E.g., Kavanagh v. Governor of Mountjoy Prison, [2002] I.E.S.C. 13 (Ir.). The accused had 
been sent to the Special Criminal Court under Section 47 by the D.P.P. The applicant brought his case to 
the UN Human Rights Committee arguing that his trial before the Special Criminal Court violated his 
rights under Art 26 of the UN Covenant, which provides for equality before the law and the committee 
upheld his complaint in that: “No reasons are required to be given for the decisions that the Special 
Criminal Court would be “proper,” or that the ordinary courts are “inadequate,” and no reasons for the 
decision in the particular case has been provide to the committee. Moreover, judicial review of the 
16
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol80/iss4/12
2012] THE IRISH INNOCENCE PROJECT 1309 
3. The Irish Innocence Project: Crucial Applicable Rights 
It must be stressed that the Irish Innocence Project deals with DNA 
and non-DNA cases and accepts cases only if the applicant indicates he 
is factually innocent. In that context, the project will look at a 
constitutional or convention violation, and thus a breach of the 
applicant’s human rights, where the applicant indicates he is factually 
innocent. Of course Convention and Constitutional issues affect a 
project in a myriad of different ways, not least access to evidence for 
testing and privacy and data retention issues, both of which are vitally 
important for the work of projects and we will look at in detail. 
i. Due Process 
As far as the Irish Innocence Project is concerned, the crucial initial 
clause is the aforementioned Article 38.1 of the Bunreacht which, worth 
quoting again, states that “no person shall be tried on any criminal 
charge save in due course of law.” 
These simple words have been elaborated upon by the Irish Judiciary 
to create, in effect, a substantive due process clause for those suspected 
of having committed a criminal offence. Thus, the issues that affect due 
process lawyers under the U.S. Constitution likewise affect Irish 
lawyers. 
In general terms, the important early case is State (Healy) v. 
Donoghue,47 per O’Higgins, C.J., where in a consideration of general 
principles the judge indicated that: 
[I]t is clear that the words due course of law in Article 38 make it 
mandatory that every criminal trial shall be conducted in accordance with 
concepts of justice, that the procedures applied shall be fair, and that the 
person accused shall be afforded every opportunity to defend himself. If 
this were not so the dignity of the individual would be ignored and the 
State would have failed to vindicate his personal rights.48 
It is now necessary to turn to specific aspects of due process relevant 
for Innocence Projects and also to relate that to Convention case law, 
which is primarily located in Article 6 of the Convention and the fair 
trial clause. Given the inherently vast nature of due process, I am 
focusing only on those aspects that singularly or at a tangent, in my 
view, affect Innocence Projects. 
 
DPP’s decisions is effectively restricted to the most exceptional and virtually undemonstrable 
circumstances.” 
 47. State v. Donoghue, [1976] IR 325 (Ir.). 
 48. Id. at 349. 
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A: The Obligation to Preserve Evidence and To Conduct Inquiries 
With regard to the Irish Innocence Project, an important recent 
constitutional innovation is the important constitutional obligation to 
preserve relevant evidence and conduct enquiries. In Braddish v. DPP,49 
video evidence allegedly showing the applicants engaged in the course 
of robbing premises was disposed of by the Gardaí (police) and was not 
available for trial. The respondent argued that that the applicant had 
signed an inculpatory confession and that the unavailability of the 
videotape simply hampered the prosecution and did not hinder the 
defense. The Supreme Court held that the failure to preserve such vital 
evidence violated the guarantee to fair procedures and in effect due 
process. 
In Dunne v. DPP50 that obligation was extended to seek out as well as 
preserve the evidence. In Bowes v. DPP,51 Hardiman, J., indicated that 
the duty to preserve potentially important evidence was not an open 
ended one and could not “be interpreted as requiring the gardai to 
engage in disproportionate commitment of manpower and resources in 
an exhaustive search for every conceivable kind of evidence.” Such a 
duty, the judge indicated, “must be interpreted realistically on the facts 
of each case.” 
In Scully v. DPP52 it was stressed that it was the securing of relevant 
evidence and, in McFarlane v. DPP,53 the Supreme Court split in 
circumstances where fingerprints and photographs had been taken and 
then the items on which those prints and photographs were taken were 
lost. The majority of the justices, led by Hardiman, J., saw nothing 
untoward in the introduction into evidence of a fingerprint or a 
photograph, the dissenting Judge Kearns thought, not unreasonably, it 
would hamper the defense in conducting their own inspection and 
finding what they may. Finally, in Savage v. DPP54 the Supreme Court 
also advised that it was best practice for the Garda to inform a suspect of 
the intention to destroy.  
It might be noted that there are also several judicial dicta to the effect 
that it would be advisable for the solicitor for the applicant to write to 
the Gardaí asking them to preserve all relevant evidence at the earliest 
opportunity and thus there was a burden on the applicant not to delay. In 
light of this recent Constitutional doctrine, the Irish Innocence Project 
 
 49. See Braddish v. D.P.P., [2001] 3 I.R. 127 (Ir.). 
 50. Dunne v. D.P.P., [2002] I.E.S.C. 27 (Ir.). 
 51. Bowes v. D.P.P., [2003] I.E.S.C. 9 (Ir.). 
 52. Scully v. D.P.P., [2005] I.E.S.C. 11 (Ir.). 
 53. McFarlane v. D.P.P., [2006] I.E.S.C. 11 (Ir.). 
 54. Savage v. D.P.P., [2008] I.E.S.C. 39 (Ir.). 
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has sent out a series of letters to the relevant divisions of the Garda 
asking them to maintain the preservation of evidence in appropriate 
cases. 
The convention under Article 6 is noticeably silent thus far on this 
issue. 
1. Preservation of Evidence Post Conviction 
A crucial question affecting all Innocence Projects is the preservation 
of evidence post-conviction for independent testing purposes. The cases 
aforementioned concerned with the preservation of evidence in the Irish 
legal system do not appear to countenance the possibility of access to 
material evidence after a final appeal, or at least there is no direct 
engagement of the issue in the existing case law and there is a kind of 
constitutional, and indeed statutory, void in this respect. 
This is in direct contrast to both the USA and the UK. In the latter the 
preservation of material evidence is governed by the Criminal and 
Procedure Act 1996 where all material that may be relevant must be 
retained at least until the convicted individual is released from custody. 
Of course, in the USA there is the Justice for All Act 2004 which allows 
for greater federal funding for post-conviction DNA testing and, hence, 
has promoted the preservation of material evidence by the State for post-
conviction testing.55 
In this context an important consideration is that the legal platform 
for the establishment of a DNA database in Ireland is imminent, with the 
expectation of the Criminal Justice (Forensic Evidence and DNA 
Database System) Bill passing through parliament in the coming 
months.56 The Irish Innocence Project has attempted to highlight, by 
intensive lobbying, a serious omission in the Bill with regard to the 
preservation of biological material from crime scenes. The Law Reform 
Commission (LRC) wrote the report on which most of the 
recommendations for the DNA database were instituted, however, the 
LRC’s recommendation for the retention of crime scene material has 
been ignored in the Bill. The LRC argued that: 
[T]he retention is principally as a safeguard in the event that an 
individual convicted of the offence to which the sample relates alleges 
that a miscarriage of justice has occurred and wishes to challenge the 
veracity of the original evidence.57 
 
 55. It is my definite understanding that in practice, some of the Irish police or Garda do preserve 
post-conviction evidence at least until a serving prisoner is released. 
 56. The bill at time of writing has lapsed and will need to be reintroduced by the new 
government. 
 57. THE LAW REFORM COMMISSION, CONSULTATION PAPER ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DNA 
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As with the issue of disclosure, the idea that material should be 
preserved to allow for the possibility of testing after conviction does not 
appear to prevail in the Irish courts. Or at least it has been up till now 
absent from the constitutional conversation. 
As I understand it, a right to post-conviction testing is the practice in 
many states in the U.S.,58 though it is not sanctioned as a federal right. 
This issue of post-conviction testing is indeed highly contentious in the 
American courts. Recently, as I understand, in Osborne the appellant 
was attempting to establish a constitutional right to post-conviction 
testing under the Due Process clause.59 This putative right was rejected 
in a highly contentious 5–4 decision, but on March 7th, 2011 in Skinner 
v. Switzer,60 as I understand it, the Supreme Court did establish that a 
prisoner could challenge inter alia as a constitutional matter the 
adequacy of an individual states provision for post-conviction testing. 
As far as Ireland is concerned, in my view, a similar argument for a 
constitutional due process right to post conviction testing was viable in 
our jurisdiction. Such a right, in my view, goes hand in glove with an 
obligation on the Garda to preserve and retain evidence at least whilst a 
prisoner is still serving time. In this context, the Irish courts could 
extend the principles in Braddish,61 where the Supreme Court held that 
the failure to preserve such vital evidence violated the guarantee to fair 
procedures to a right to preserve post-conviction material, at least as far 
as a serving prisoner is concerned. The courts could then link such a 
right to a right to post conviction testing. All of this could be 
accomplished within the rubric of Article 38.1, the trial in due course of 
law clause, and due process clause. 
Thus, as far as Irish due process law is concerned, a challenge, in my 
view, was viable in principle to establish as emanations of due process. 
(1) The right to post conviction access to evidence 
(2) The right to post conviction preservation of evidence and 
(3) The right to post conviction testing of evidence 
The project prepared a case62 and, at my suggestion and that of Dr 
Steve O’Donoghue who prepared an internal report, sought the expert 
 
DATABASE (2004), available at http://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/consultation%20papers/ 
cpDNADatabase.pdf. 
 58. All 50 states now endorse the right to post-conviction testing. 
 59. Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 129 S.Ct. 238 (2009). 
 60. Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S.Ct. 1289 (2011). 
 61. Braddish, [2001] I.E.S.C.45 (Ir.). 
 62. I would like to thank the three caseworkers involved in this case Dr Steve O’Donoghue, 
Edward Matthews, and Audrey Brown Gallen for their trojan and, in some instances (Ed and Audrey), 
continuing work and involvement in this case. 
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advice of Dr Greg Hampikian as to whether this case could benefit from 
more advance DNA testing. Ed and Audrey then prepared a closing 
report and the project collectively agreed that the matter be referred 
back to solicitors (Garret Sheehan and Co.63) and counsel instructed. 
This case is very much ongoing in the Irish courts and, as I write, a 
leave for judicial review application was successful in the Irish High 
Court and a fully-fledged judicial review constitutional case on access to 
evidence is being fought. 
I now turn briefly to the other due process issues of relevance, though 
less compelling than the right to post conviction testing. 
B. The Right to Silence 
In the United States the Fifth Amendment, as I understand it, contains 
a specific privilege against self-incrimination, which is binding on the 
individual states via the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. 
Thus, a statute compelling someone to give answers to police questions 
would be unconstitutional unless it gave immunity to that person.64 
Further, comment by the prosecution or the judge on an accused 
person’s failure to testify has been held to violate the guarantee.65 In 
contrast the Irish domestic jurisprudence on the point is much less 
protective of the right. 
1. The Irish Constitutional Position on The Right to Silence 
In Heaney v. Ireland,66 the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of section 52 of The Offences Against the State Act, 
which made failure to account for one’s movements when requested to 
do so under that Act a punishable offence. 
O’Flaherty, J., located the right to silence in Article 40 as a corollary 
to the freedom of expression conferred by that Article but indicated that: 
[I]t is clear that the right to freedom of expressions is not absolute. It is 
expressly stated in the Constitution to be subject to public order and 
morality. The same must be true of its correlative right—the right to 
silence.67 
The Irish courts have also upheld the constitutionality of drawing 
inferences, e.g., from marks on clothes; though an inference cannot be a 
ground for conviction in the absence of other evidence, only proper 
 
 63. Who I want to thank for taking this case and extend my thanks also to counsel in this respect. 
 64. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). 
 65. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
 66. Heaney v. Ireland, [1996] 1 IR 580 (Ir.). 
 67. Id. at 589. 
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inferences can be drawn. The Irish courts have also indicated that the 
right was not absolute and might be qualified by the State in its pursuit 
of the maintenance of public order, so long as the privilege was affected 
as little as possible. Finally, they have suggested, doubtfully, that 
legislation may validly require a person to answer questions which tend 
to incriminate him and the answers to such questions would be 
admissible in criminal proceedings against the individual. 
2. The Position under the Convention 
It might be noted that Heaney was taken to the European Court of 
Human Rights68 where the European Court found that, rather than a 
restriction on the right to silence, Section 52 constituted an abolition of 
the right to silence, which was not justified by any emergency or 
consideration of public order. The essence of the finding in Heaney is 
contained in the following extract: 
Accordingly, the Court finds that the “degree of compulsion” imposed 
on the applicants by the application of section 52 of the 1939 Act with a 
view to compelling them to provide information relating to charges 
against them under that Act in effect destroyed the very essence of their 
privilege against self-incrimination and their right to remain silent.69 
The court also concluded the following: 
The Court, accordingly, finds that the security and public order 
concerns relied on by the Government cannot justify a provision which 
extinguishes the very essence of the applicants’ rights to silence and 
against self-incrimination guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.  
It concludes, therefore, that there has been a violation of the 
applicants’ right to silence and their right not to incriminate themselves 
guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.70 
The European Court has also decided that evidence obtained 
compulsorily in a civil process may not be used to threaten or to institute 
criminal proceedings against that person.71 The European Court has also 
considered the drawing of inferences from the silence of an accused. In 
John Murray v. United Kingdom72 the court opined: 
On the one hand, it is self-evident that it is incompatible with the 
immunities under consideration to base a conviction solely or mainly on 
 
 68. Heaney v. Ireland, App. No. 34720/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001). 
 69. Id. at 55. 
 70. Id. at ¶¶ 58, 59. 
 71. Weh v. Austria, App. No.38544/97, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004). This case summarises the present 
position of the ECHR on silence and is a useful authority. 
 72. John Murray v. United Kingdom, App. No. 18731/91, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1996). 
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the accused’s silence or on a refusal to answer questions or to give 
evidence himself. On the other hand, the Court deems it equally obvious 
that these immunities cannot and should not prevent that the accused’s 
silence, in situations, which clearly call for an explanation from him, be 
taken into account in assessing the persuasiveness of the evidence 
adduced by the prosecution. 
Whether the drawing of adverse inferences from an accused’s silence 
infringes Article 6 (art. 6) is a matter to be determined in the light of all 
the circumstances of the case, having particular regard to the situations 
where inferences may be drawn, the weight attached to them by the 
national courts in their assessment of the evidence and the degree of 
compulsion inherent in the situation.73 
As far as an Innocence Project is concerned, there may very well be 
serving prisoners alleging factual innocence who have been convicted 
under the domestic understanding of the right to silence which the 
European Court has frowned upon and which could be challenged. I am 
informed that in practice though, where somebody has given evidence 
compulsorily in a civil process, the Garda do not, given the Convention 
case law, recycle that evidence for a criminal investigation but build 
their evidence from base zero. I am also informed that prosecutions 
under Section 52 of the OSA which criminalizes silence are in practice 
not instituted, though the Act has not been repealed. Though of course, 
all of the above has to be read in the light of the supremacy of the 
Constitution to the Convention and the aforementioned impoverished 
manner of incorporation of the Convention.  
Thus the possibility exists that a factually innocent prisoner could 
exist who claims they have been convicted on the basis of violations of 
the right to silence, particularly in the light of Convention case law. 
Particularly troublesome might be a historic admission where the Garda 
conduct an interview with no solicitor present. 
C. Access to Legal Advisers 
1. The Irish Constitution on Access to Legal Advice 
The leading case on access to legal advice is People (DPP) v. 
Healy.74 That case firmly established the right of access to a solicitor in 
respect of a person in Garda custody as a constitutional right, as opposed 
to a legal right. The suspect had a right to be told of the arrival of his 
solicitor and a right to immediate access. However, In Ireland access 
 
 73. Id. at ¶ 47. 
 74. See D.P.P. v. Healy, [1990] 2 IR 73 (Ir.). 
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means reasonable access, an accused is not entitled to have his solicitor 
sit in on interviews as decided in Lavery v. Member in Charge.75 
The Supreme Court decided that a “solicitor is not entitled to be 
present at the interviews. Neither was it open to the respondent, or his 
solicitor, to prescribe the manner by which the interviews might be 
conducted, or where.”76 
Moreover, People v. Buck77 established that the questioning of a 
suspect pending the arrival of a solicitor is not constitutionally 
forbidden.78 
2. The Convention 
All of the above is arguably contrary to the jurisprudence of the 
ECHR in Averill v. United Kingdom79 where the court opined that “the 
concept of fairness enshrined in Article 6 requires that the accused have 
the benefit of the assistance of a lawyer already at the initial stages of 
police interrogation.”80 
The Court clarified their position further recently in Salduz v. Turkey 
and, in the crucial part of the holding, indicated that “[n]ational laws 
may attach consequences to the attitude of an accused at the initial 
stages of police interrogation which are decisive for the prospects of the 
defense in any subsequent criminal proceedings . . . .” 
Against this background, the Court finds that in order for the right to 
a fair trial to remain sufficiently “practical and effective” (see paragraph 
51 above) Article 6 § 1 requires that, as a rule, access to a lawyer should 
be provided from the first interrogation of a suspect by the police, unless 
it is demonstrated, in the light of the particular circumstances of each 
case, that there are compelling reasons to restrict this right. Even where 
compelling reasons may exceptionally justify denial of access to a 
lawyer, such restriction—whatever its justification—must not unduly 
prejudice the rights of the accused under Article 6. The rights of the 
defense will in principle be irretrievably prejudiced when incriminating 
statements made during police interrogation without access to a lawyer 
are used for a conviction.81 
 
 75. Lavery v. Member in Charge, [1999] 2 IR 390 (Ir.). 
 76. Id. at 396. 
 77. See D.P.P. v. Buck, [2002] I.E.S.C. 23 (Ir.). 
 78. In practice, the Irish Garda tell me they phone for a solicitor and then wait approximately 45 
minutes. If a solicitor has not appeared in that time, they conduct the interview. Of the many I have talk 
with, 45 minutes is the constant refrain. It might be noted in Ireland, unlike in the UK, there is no duty 
solicitor scheme. 
 79. Averill v. United Kingdom, App. No. 36408/97, Eur. Ct. H.R., (2001). 
 80. Id. at ¶ 59. 
 81. Id. at ¶¶ 52–55. 
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Thus the position, as a matter of Convention law, somewhat baldly is 
that in other than exceptional circumstances, the accused is entitled to 
have access to a lawyer prior to being interviewed, and certainly if 
admissions were made prior to a lawyer being present. It is important to 
stress that only exceptional circumstances, not as in Ireland where an 
administrative practice would, warrant the deprivation of a lawyer. 
As far as the Irish Innocence Project is concerned, if there are 
prisoners who are factually innocent and have been convicted as a result 
of an interview without a solicitor being present, there is a strong 
convention argument that Irish law should be changed to reflect the 
convention decisions. However, given the approach of the Irish Supreme 
Court towards the interpretative obligation, it is possible, in my view, 
ultimately, that you would have to take a case against Ireland to the 
ECHR to win such an argument. 
D. Evidence Unconstitutionally Obtained/The Exclusionary Rule 
1. The Irish Constitutional Position 
The general rule was laid down in People (Attorney General) v. 
O’Brien.82 It is as follows: evidence obtained as a result of a deliberate 
breach of a constitutional right should be excluded, unless there are 
extraordinary excusing circumstances, which justify its admission. 
Further, subsequent cases have established that if the act which amounts 
to a denial of a constitutional right is deliberate, it is immaterial whether 
the individual Garda is aware he is acting in violation of the 
Constitution. To hold otherwise would be to place a premium on 
ignorance of the law and the Constitution. Thus, the Irish Courts do not 
accept the so called good faith exception in United States v. Leon.83 This 
position was firmly articulated in the case, People (DPP) v. Kenny.84 
In that case Finlay CJ said: 
[T]he correct principle is that evidence obtained by invasion of the 
constitutional personal rights of a citizen must be excluded unless a court 
is satisfied that either the act constituting the breach . . . was committed 
unintentionally or accidentally, or is satisfied that there are extraordinary 
excusing circumstances . . . . 
Detection of crime and conviction, no matter how important, cannot 
outweigh the unambiguously expressed constitutional obligation, as far 
 
 82. People v. O’Brien, [1965] IR 142 (Ir.). 
 83. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
 84. D.P.P. v. Kenny, [1990] 2 IR 110 (Ir.). 
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as practicable, to vindicate the personal rights of the citizen.85 
Finlay, C.J., pointed out to exclude only evidence obtained by a 
person who knows he is violating a constitutional right would be to 
impose a negative deterrent only, an absolute protection rule, however, 
incorporates an additional positive encouragement to acquaint oneself 
with the personal rights of the citizen. In another case, Healy,86 
McCarthy, J., explicitly rejected the good faith submission and opined 
that: 
[A] violation of constitutional rights is not to be excused by the 
ignorance of the violator, no more than ignorance of the law can ensure to 
the benefit of a person who . . . is presumed to have intended the natural 
and probable consequences of his conduct. If it were otherwise, there 
would be a premium on ignorance.87 
Examples of acts which have been held to violate the constitutional 
rights of an accused person, and thus render evidence inadmissible, are 
as follows, failure to allow reasonable access to a solicitor, 
unconstitutional deprivation of liberty following the expiry of a lawful 
period of detention, violation of the right to inviolability of the dwelling 
(Article 40.5) by proceeding on the basis of a warrant with an inherent 
defect. It might be noted that oppressive questioning will also be a 
ground for exclusion. In DPP v. Lynch,88 the Supreme Court held that 
the sustained questioning of the accused over a 22 hour period, coupled 
with the denial of access to his family or the opportunity for rest or sleep 
all amounted to such circumstances of harassment and oppression as to 
make it unjust and unfair to admit statements. 
2. Accidental or De Minimis Mistakes 
In DPP v. Balfe,89 Murphy, J., distinguished O’Brien and Kenny, thus, 
a search warrant that innocently, but vitally, inaccurately describes 
premises, which may be searched on the basis thereof, is not without 
operative effect. Property seized in innocent reliance thereon may be 
admissible, but where a warrant is made without authority it has no 
value in law, however innocent the mistake. Thus, de minimis mistakes 
are constitutionally acceptable. 
 
 85. Id. at 134. 
 86. D.P.P. v. Healy, [1990] 2 I.R. 73 (Ir.). 
 87. Id. at 89. 
 88. See D.P.P. v. Lynch, [1982] IR 64 (Ir.). 
 89. See D.P.P. v. Balfe, [1998] 4 IR 50 (Ir.). 
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3. Extraordinary Excusing Circumstances 
In O’Brien, the case that coined the phrase, Walsh, J., gave examples 
of what might amount to extraordinary excusing circumstances, 
rendering evidence admissible which would normally be inadmissible as 
obtained in breach of the Constitution. These include the need to rescue 
a victim in peril or to prevent the imminent destruction of vital evidence. 
In Shaw,90 the chance of finding a victim alive was such an 
extraordinary excusing circumstance to justify the lengthy detention of 
the accused, (per Griffin, J.) or for admitting the appellants’ statements 
(per Walsh, J.). In Lawless,91 the police, in a manhole beside the flat, 
found seventeen packets of heroin. These packets had apparently been 
flushed down the lavatory as the police were entering the house. The 
court considered that this fell into the category of the need to prevent the 
imminent destruction of vital evidence. Mere eagerness on the part of 
the police to extend their investigations into offences other than those in 
connection with circumstances the person was originally submitted to 
questioning for, does not amount to an extraordinary excusing 
circumstance sufficient to justify detention.92 A remarkable extension of 
the principle is found in Freeman v. DPP93 where the gardaí, having 
chased subjects, followed them into a private dwelling where they found 
stolen property.  
4. The Convention 
The position under the Convention is contained in Schenk v. 
Switzerland,94 which indicates that: 
While Article 6 (art. 6) of the Convention guarantees the right to a fair 
trial; it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence as 
such, which is therefore primarily a matter for regulation under national 
law. The Court therefore cannot exclude as a matter of principle and in 
the abstract that unlawfully obtained evidence of the present kind may be 
admissible. It has only to ascertain whether Mr. Schenk’s trial as a whole 
was fair. 
The Convention, whilst examining whether the overall trial was fair, 
primarily leaves it for the member state.  
As far as the Irish Innocence Project is concerned, it is unlikely that 
such issues would not have been addressed at the actual trial or an 
 
 90. D.P.P. v. Shaw, [1982] IR 1 at 26 (Ir.). 
 91. People (D.P.P.) v. Lawless, Unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, Nov. 28th, 1985. 
 92. (1985) 3 Frewen 30. 
 93. Freeman v. D.P.P., [1996] 3 I.R. 565 (Ir.). 
 94. Schenk v. Switzerland, App. No. 10862/84, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1988). 
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appeal; but the exclusionary rule is broad and a contention of some fresh 
evidence of a constitutional breach, fused with an averment of factual 
innocence certainly invokes the jurisdiction of the project in principle. 
In my view, there potentially would be the basis for the ultimate 
overturning of a conviction as a miscarriage of justice on due process 
criteria as long as, of course, the prisoner stipulates they are factually 
innocent. 
E. Right to an Interpreter 
An issue that is appearing time and time again in Irish Innocence 
Project cases is the absence of an interpreter. There is no conclusive 
Irish case that resolves the issue, though a judge accepted, in a case 
presented, that there was such a right in custody and then conclusively 
ruled it had not been violated! 
Under the Convention, this principle was first announced in 
Kamasinski v. Austria95 as deriving from Article 6, though unsuccessful 
on the facts. It would seem in principle from Kamasinski that the right to 
an interpreter applies not just at trial but in custody and in particular at 
interview.  
In Ireland, this is potentially an important due process issue for the 
Innocence Project. Given the increased amount of non-nationals in the 
state, these issues again would presumably be dealt with in trial, but if 
such an issue were not adequately dealt with and there was an assertion 
of factual innocence, then the jurisdiction of the project is invoked. 
F. Disclosure 
The issues surrounding the disclosure of evidence in a criminal case 
are well exemplified by the Paul Ward case, Ward v. Special Criminal 
Court.96 Here, the prosecution withheld documents from the defense on 
the grounds of the potential of a danger to a third party from the 
disclosure of the documents. In the end, the Special Criminal Court97 
agreed that the court would be shown the documents and would rule on 
whether to disclose or not disclose to the defense. Hence, in the Irish 
courts, there is judicial inspection of the documents before a decision is 
made with regard to disclosure. 
The jurist Ní Raifeartaigh also remarks how this decision is 
undertaken “where the judicial authority making the decision has, at the 
time of the initial decision on disclosure, no knowledge of the defense 
 
 95. Kamasinski v. Austria, App. No. 9783/82, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1989). 
 96. See Ward v. Special Criminal Ct., [1998] 2 I.L.R.M. 493 (Ir.). 
 97. An emergency court that is an anomalous and deeply disturbing feature of Irish law. 
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that will be put forward at the trial.”98 
With regard to the ECHR, the same writer concludes that while there: 
[I]s a general right of disclosure pursuant to Article 6(1), this right of 
disclosure is not absolute and is subject to competing rights such as 
national security, the need to protect witnesses who are at risk of 
reprisals, and the need to keep secret police methods of investigating 
crime. Secondly, only such measures restricting the rights of the defense 
as are strictly necessary will be permissible. Thirdly, any difficulties 
caused to the defense by a limitation on its rights must be 
counterbalanced as far as possible by appropriate procedural measures. It 
is perhaps important to emphasize that in such applications, the European 
Court does not attempt to second-guess the domestic court as to whether 
disclosure should have been ordered or not on the particular facts of the 
case. What is, however, of concern to the European Court is whether the 
procedures comply with the principle of equality of arms envisaged by 
Article 6(1). It may help to think of the Court’s examination as being one 
directed to “process” rather than “outcome” in this context.99 
Similar to the issues surrounding the preservation of evidence, the 
possibility of the disclosure of exculpatory evidence post-trial does not 
appear to have arisen in the Irish courts. This is in direct contrast to the 
USA where Stevens, J., dissenting judgment in Osborne, quoted from 
Imbler v. Pachtman to the effect, “[A]fter a conviction the prosecutor 
also is bound by the ethics of his office to inform the appropriate 
authority of after-acquired or other information that casts doubt upon the 
correctness of the conviction.”100 
No such direction from the Irish courts appears to have been 
forthcoming thus far. 
II. THE RELEVANCE OF THE PRIVACY RIGHT AND THE STORAGE AND 
RETENTION OF PRIVATE INFORMATION 
A. The Constitution 
1. Ireland  
The unspecified right to privacy was recognized in the context of the 
right to access contraceptives for married couples in McGee v. AG.101 It 
has been extended to a myriad of different contexts, sexual rights, 
 
 98. UnaNi Raifeartaigh, The Eur. Convention on H.R. and the Irish Crim. Just. System, JUD. 
STUD. INST. J. 22 (2004). 
 99. Id. at 23. 
 100. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 n.25 (1976). 
 101. McGee v. Attorney Gen, [1974] IR 284 (Ir.). 
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transexuality, journalistic intrusions, as well as surveillance techniques. 
From an Irish Innocence Project point of view, a crucial question is 
whether it will be applied to the storage and retention of information. 
As aforementioned, the establishment of a DNA database in Ireland 
the Criminal Justice (Forensic Evidence and DNA Database System) 
Bill which was about to come into law has been delayed and perhaps 
temporarily shelved. The Irish Innocence Project is currently lobbying 
Parliament regarding this serious omission in the Bill concerning the 
preservation of biological material from crime scenes. As mentioned 
earlier, the Law Reform Commission (LRC) urged the same, but their 
advice has been ignored. 
The crucial and arguably unwelcome authority from an Innocence 
project perspective, in many respects, is S & Marper v. United 
Kingdom.102 The European court considered the retention of DNA, 
fingerprints and cellular samples. As far as cellular samples were 
concerned the court noted that: 
The Court finds that the blanket and indiscriminate nature of the 
powers of retention of the fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA 
profiles of persons suspected but not convicted of offences, as applied in 
the case of the present applicants, fails to strike a fair balance between the 
competing public and private interests and that the respondent State has 
overstepped any acceptable margin of appreciation in this regard. 
Accordingly, the retention at issue constitutes a disproportionate 
interference with the applicants’ right to respect for private life and 
cannot be regarded as necessary in a democratic society.103 
This is a noted example of how a human rights case can cut against 
the interests of an innocence project. Far from being against storage in 
many circumstances, Innocence Projects welcome the same. It will be 
interesting to see how the Irish courts react to Marper. In particular, an 
issue I have separately written on, there is the extent to which the right 
to privacy post-Marper curtails the right to retain DNA samples of non-
convicted persons. An Irish Act is imminent (but then again has been for 
a while) and will try to deal with these concerns, though there is a 
possibility that litigation may have to ensue to clarify the law and assist 
The Irish project. 
 
 102. S. & Marper v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 30562/04 & 30566/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2008). 
 103. Id. at ¶¶ 105,125. 
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2. Treatment in Custody: The Right to the Protection of One’s Health: 
Bodily Integrity/Inhuman and Degrading Treatment and Torture 
In Ryan v. AG,104 the Irish Supreme Court upheld the judgment of 
Kenny, J., that one of the unenumerated rights protected by Article 40.3 
of the Irish Constitution was the right to bodily integrity. However, the 
Irish Supreme Court went on to say that the State had the duty of 
protecting the citizens from dangers to health in a manner not 
incompatible or inconsistent with the rights of those citizens as human 
persons. 
In the subsequent case of State (C.) v. Frawley,105 Judge Finlay, 
though in refusing the application, held that the right to bodily integrity 
did not just apply to legislation as Ryan seemed to indicate, but also 
operated to prevent acts or omissions of the executive which, without 
justification, would expose the health of a person to risk or danger, 
including persons in prison. The question was: Had the executive failed 
in its duty?  
The issue of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment is more 
extensively canvassed in the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights under Article 3 of the Convention where the 
jurisprudence of the court establishes the following propositions: 
(i) Ill treatment must attain a particular or minimum level of suffering 
before it is classified as inhuman. 
(ii): To be degrading, the humiliation or debasement must attain a 
particular level. 
(iii): Torture must have a particular intensity of suffering. 
The particular intensity of suffering required for torture has been 
made out by rape, persistent and aggravated beatings, electric shock 
treatment, and the bastinado. 
As far as inhuman and degrading treatment is concerned, a useful 
disquisition is contained in the Isle of Man Birching case, Tyrer v. 
UK.106 The Court indicated that “it remains true that the suffering 
occasioned must attain a particular level before a punishment can be 
classified as “inhuman” within the meaning of Article 3.107 
The court then went on to consider the degrading issue: 
In the Court’s view, in order for a punishment to be “degrading” and 
in breach of Article 3 (art. 3), the humiliation or debasement involved 
 
 104. See Ryan v. Attorney Gen., [1965] I.R. 294 (Ir.). 
 105. See State v. Frawley, [1976] I.R. 365 (Ir.). 
 106. Tyrer v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5856/72, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1978). 
 107. Id. at 29. 
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must attain a particular level and must in any event be other than that 
usual element of humiliation referred to in the preceding subparagraph. 
The assessment is, in the nature of things, relative: it depends on all the 
circumstances of the case and, in particular, on the nature and context of 
the punishment itself and the manner and method of its execution.108 
On the facts of the case the court concluded: 
[V]iewing these circumstances as a whole, the Court finds that the 
applicant was subjected to a punishment in which the element of 
humiliation attained the level inherent in the notion of “degrading 
punishment” as explained at paragraph 30 above. The indignity of having 
the punishment administered over the bare posterior aggravated to some 
extent the degrading character of the applicant’s punishment but it was 
not the only or determining factor.109 
The court has also indicated that mental suffering from, for example, 
racism can make out degrading treatment. 
In Wainwright v. UK,110 the court indicated in a summary of general 
principles on ill treatment that: 
Ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall 
within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention. The assessment of this 
minimum level of severity is relative; it depends on all the circumstances 
of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental 
effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and health of the victim. In 
considering whether a treatment is “degrading” within the meaning of 
Article 3, the Court will have regard to whether its object is to humiliate 
and debase the person concerned and whether, as far as the consequences 
are concerned, it adversely affected his personality in a manner 
incompatible with Article 3. Though it may be noted that the absence of 
such a purpose does not conclusively rule out a finding of a violation.111 
Thus the court does not agree with the conclusion of the Irish domestic 
court in Frawley that in order to make out inhuman or degrading 
treatment or torture there need be an evil purpose. 
4. Oppressive Questioning 
The Constitution prohibits interrogation that is oppressive as a 
fundamental violation of due process. Evidence obtained as a result of 
such practices will be excluded, absent extraordinary excusing 
circumstances. In particular, the courts have frowned on the practice of 
extracting a confession out of an accused by lengthy questioning without 
 
 108. Id. at 30. 
 109. Id. at 35. 
 110. Wainwright v. United Kingdom, App. No. 12350/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006). 
 111. Id. at 41. 
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a break. In People (DPP) v. McNally,112 convictions based on 40 hours 
of continuous questioning were quashed by reason of such oppression. 
In DPP v. Lynch,113 the Supreme Court held that the sustained 
questioning of the accused over a 22 hour period, coupled with the 
denial of access to his family or the opportunity for rest or sleep all 
amounted to such circumstances of harassment and oppression as to 
make it unjust and unfair to admit statements. 
In People (AG) v. O’Brien,114 Kingsmill Moore, J., (Lavery and 
Budd, J.J., concurring) said obiter that to countenance the use of 
evidence extracted or discovered by gross personal violence would 
involve the State in moral defilement. 
Furthermore, provisions now exist for the electronic recording of all 
interviews, and, although notable provisos do allow exceptions to this 
practice, the superior courts have shown a growing impatience with the 
police force where recording is not available.115 
Finally, it should be noted that the Criminal Justice Act 1984, 
(Treatment of Persons in Custody un Garda Siochana Stations) 
Regulations 1987, regulates in a detailed fashion many aspects of the 
treatment of a suspect in custody, including the mandatory custody 
record, access to medical attention, and the conduct of interviews.  
While a breach of these regulations does not automatically exclude 
evidence, they are designed to provide added protections to a suspect in 
custody. 
As far as Innocence Projects are concerned then, the treatment of a 
suspect in police custody can invoke constitutional and convention 
considerations, as long as such matters were not dealt with at trial. 
Again, fresh evidence would be required of a police practice in order to 
invoke the jurisdiction of the project. Thus, in principle, where there is 
inhumane degrading treatment or oppressive questioning which was not 
adequately dealt with at trial or an appeal (though this is unlikely) 
coupled with a statement of factual innocence then the jurisdiction of the 
Project is invoked. 
5. Human Rights and Prisoners 
The above concludes a survey of the various rights that could apply to 
prisoners but, given that an Innocence Project typically represents 
serving prisoners, a crucial question is, are prisoners invested with 
 
 112. See People v. McNally, [1981] 2 Frewen 83 (Ir.). 
 113. See Lynch, [1982] IR 64 (Ir.). 
 114. See People v. O’Brien, [1965] IR 142 (Ir.). 
 115. Criminal Justice Act, 1984 (Electronic Recording of Interviews) Regulations 1997; see also 
Rattigan v. D.P.P. [2008] I.E.S.C. 34 (Ir.). 
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constitutional or Human Rights and if so, to what extent? 
In Shaw v. Murphy116 the United States Supreme Court indicated that 
incarceration does not divest prisoners of all constitutional protections. 
Likewise, in State (Richardson) v. Governor of Mountjoy Prison,117 
Barrington, J., indicated that a convicted prisoner could be released by 
habeas corpus in at least some cases: 
If a court were convinced that the authorities were taking advantage of 
the fact that a person was detained, consciously and deliberately to 
violate his constitutional rights or to subject him to inhuman or degrading 
treatment, the court must order his release. Likewise, if the court were 
convinced that the condition of a prisoner’s detention were such as to 
seriously endanger his life or health, and that the authorities intended to 
do nothing to rectify these conditions, the court might release him. The 
position would be similar if the conditions of the prisoner’s detention 
were such as to seriously to threaten his life or health, but the authorities 
were, for some reason, unable to rectify the conditions.118 
Further, Barrington, J., opines that that “[t]here is no iron curtain 
between the Constitution and the prisons in the Republic either.”119 
The judge held that convicted prisoners continue to enjoy a number of 
constitutional rights, including the right of access to the courts, and the 
judge reserved for a further occasion the question as to whether a 
prisoner charged with an alleged breach of discipline is ever entitled to 
consult a solicitor. 
In other cases, prisoners have been accorded the right to communicate 
with journalists in some instances and have been recently in Ireland, as a 
result of an ECHR decision, accorded the right to vote. 
In my view, these dicta are welcome and critical from an Innocence 
Project point of view if we wish to establish a prisoner’s constitutional 
right to post conviction testing. The Irish courts are at least receptive to 
constitutional rights being applied to prisoners. 
Of course, in the U.S. in Osborne, as aforementioned, a 5–4 decision 
of the U.S. Supreme Court refused a right to post-conviction testing 
under Due Process. From our point of view, more noticeable is the 
dissent of Stevens, J., where the eminent judge indicated that: 
The fact that nearly all the States have now recognized some post-
conviction right to DNA evidence makes it more, not less, appropriate to 
recognize a limited federal right to such evidence in cases where litigants 
are unfairly barred from obtaining relief in state courts . . . [and post-
 
 116. Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 228–29 (2001). 
 117. [1980] ILRM 82. 
 118. Id. at 90–91. 
 119. Id. at 90. A quote endorsed in the prisoners’ rights case of Gilligan v. Governor of Portlaoise 
Prison, Unreported, High Court, 12th Apr. 2001 (Per McKechnie, J). 
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conviction testing was consistent with] . . . recent trends in legal ethics 
recognizing that prosecutors are obliged to disclose all forms of 
exculpatory evidence that come into their possession following 
conviction. 
The judge concluded pithily and exactly in terms one would welcome 
from an Irish court that: 
In sum, an individual’s interest in his physical liberty is one of 
constitutional significance. That interest would be vindicated by 
providing post-conviction access to DNA evidence, as would the State’s 
interest in ensuring that it punishes the true perpetrator of the crime. In 
this case the state has suggested no countervailing interest that justifies its 
refusal to allow Osborne to test the evidence in its possession and has not 
provided any other non-arbitrary explanation for its conduct. 
Consequently, I am left to conclude that the State’s failure to provide 
Osborne access to the evidence constitutes arbitrary action that offends 
basic principles of due process. 
In the United Kingdom, Dr Naughton has linked the right to access 
DNA testing after conviction with, inter alia, the Article 5 right to 
liberty and Article 3 prohibition against torture and inhumane and 
degrading treatment. I concur and add that Article 6 on access to a fair 
trial is also relevant. 
III. CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS 
The above constitutes a survey of the principles from the case law and 
the conclusions and insights from the jurisprudence of the appellate 
courts on miscarriages applications and interpreting the nuances of Irish 
Constitutional and European Convention law. In this Part of the article, I 
want to highlight first some potential problems about the approach of 
the appellate courts and some potential issues that might dominate future 
jurisprudence. Finally, I shall conclude with some perspectives on how 
overall practices may be improved to assist in exonerating those 
imprisoned falsely who claim to be victims of injustice. 
First, the jurisprudence of the appellate courts in Kelly,120 in particular 
in the area of opinion evidence, would seem to shy away from 
embracing these opinions as new or newly discovered facts.121 This 
could pose significant difficulties in the area of forensic retesting of 
physical or biological evidence, the interpretation of which relies on the 
opinions of forensic experts. For example, the use of DNA to exonerate 
 
 120. See D.P.P. v. Kelly, [2009] IECCA 56 (Ir.). 
 121. In particular, the judgment in Kelly previously dealt with, where the Court asserted that “for 
expert opinions to be admissible as newly discovered facts, the state of scientific knowledge as of the 
date of the trial must be invalidated or thrown into significant uncertainty by newly developed science.” 
35
Langwallner: The Irish Innocence Project
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013
1328 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80 
convicted individuals has been crucial in the investigation of 
miscarriages of justice, especially in the United States. In particular, 
exonerations have occurred as a result of more advanced DNA testing. 
The acid question for an Irish court will ultimately be the extent to 
which more advanced DNA Testing constitutes either new or newly 
discovered evidence for the purposes of a miscarriage of justice 
application. 
In Northern Ireland, the more sensitive low copy number DNA 
profiling was originally rejected as evidence in R. v. Hoey,122 however, it 
was recently accepted under certain conditions in England in R. v. Reed 
& Reed.123 Another sensitive and specialized DNA profiling technique, 
Y-STR profiling, has also been readily accepted in American courts.124 
In Ireland, we currently use the standard S.G.M. test; however, our State 
Forensic Laboratory does not carry out other more advanced and 
sensitive techniques. Indeed, given the reluctance to embrace expert 
evidence as new or newly discovered facts in the light of Kelly, it 
remains to be seen how our appellate courts would accept expert opinion 
presenting more sensitive DNA profiling that casts doubt on the safety 
of a conviction. 
Second, the area of ineffective legal counsel has been brought up in 
the C.C.A. in McDonagh125 and Murray.126 Although the applicants in 
these cases were unsuccessful on the facts, the principle that ineffective 
legal counsel could be grounds for granting a miscarriage of justice 
certificate has been accepted. In McDonagh the C.C.A. indicated that, in 
exceptional circumstances, the conduct of a trial and steps taken 
preliminary to the trial by the legal advisors of an accused would give 
rise to an appeal, consistent with the requirement of the Constitution that 
no person was to be tried on any criminal charge “save in due course of 
law” and that the conduct of the defense may in certain circumstances, 
either at the trial or in the steps preparatory thereto, be such as to create 
a serious risk of a miscarriage of justice.  
In Murray Geoghegan, J., indicated as follows: 
There is no doubt that as a matter of law and in exceptional 
circumstances a conviction may be quashed by the Court of Criminal 
Appeal on the grounds that a miscarriage of justice may have arisen from 
incompetent handling of the defense at the trial. Cases in support of that 
proposition have been cited but it is not necessary to review them. It is 
 
 122. See R. v. Hoey, [2007] N.I.C.C. 49 (N. Ir.). 
 123. R. v. Reed, [2009] E.W.C.A. Crim. 2698 (Eng.). 
 124. See Shabazz v. State, 592 S.E.2d 876 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). 
 125. D.P.P. v. McDonagh, [2001] 3 IR 201 (Ir.). 
 126. D.P.P. v. Martin Murray, [2005] I.E.C.C.A. 34 (Ir.). 
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well known that that is the legal position.127 
Accordingly, the issue of ineffective legal counsel may in the future 
become a more prevalent feature of miscarriage of justice cases. Indeed, 
it is one of the major issues leading to findings of a miscarriage of 
justice in the United States and is frequently invoked by Innocence 
projects where, of course, there is also a claim of factual innocence. The 
dicta in Murray and McDonagh are timorous and tentative in nature and 
do not address what the rather opaque phrase exceptional circumstances 
entails. 
It might be noted that in the U.S., as I understand the case law, a test 
for ineffective assistance of counsel within the rubric of due process has 
evolved in a series of cases. In the leading case of Strickland v. 
Washington,128 the Supreme Court indicated that a lawyers assistance is 
ineffective if it “so undermined the functioning of the adversary process 
that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result.”129 
The court also indicated that the burden of proof is on the defendant 
to show his lawyer was ineffective and the court will presume, absent 
proof to the contrary, that the lawyer was effective. In order to 
demonstrate ineffective assistance, a defendant must show that his 
lawyers’ performance fell below the required standard and was 
ineffective due to serious mistakes and that said mistakes prejudiced the 
defendant’s case. In this context, prejudice means that the result of the 
trial would have been different but for those mistakes. 
It is to be hoped as the case law progresses so to will the Irish courts 
evolve such comprehensive and sophisticated standards. 
Third, an area which appears not to have been canvassed before the 
Irish Courts in detail, is wrongful conviction as a result of false 
confessions. The International Innocence Network has long since 
recognized not only the possibility, but propensity, of false confessions 
giving rise to wrongful conviction and, as such, this is a currently 
inadequately explored area in our jurisprudence.130 Historically, in 
Ireland, one could be convicted on the basis of confession evidence 
alone; it was left to the judge’s discretion as to whether he warned the 
jury about the absence of any corroborative evidence. That said, 
following a number of high profile miscarriage of justices which came 
to light in Ireland and England in the late 1980’s, the legislature 
intervened in this area, by virtue of s. 10 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
1993. The Act provides that “[w]here at a trial of a person on indictment 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 129. Id. at 686. 
 130. Richard P. Conti, Psychology of False Confessions, J. CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENT & WITNESS 
PSYCHOL. (1999). 
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evidence is given of a confession made by that person and that evidence 
is not corroborated, the judge shall advise the jury to have due regard to 
the absence of corroboration.” 
Essentially, in Irish criminal law, this provides that a jury must be 
warned that the absence of corroborative evidence must be in their 
minds where confession evidence is the main or sole plank of the 
prosecution case and is unsupported by exterior evidence.131 It remains 
the case that the false confession is an under canvassed area of our 
miscarriage of justice jurisprudence. 
A further set of issues concerns recantation cases, of which the Irish 
project has attracted several. Such cases pose enormous problems in 
getting a witness to recant (given among other things the consequences 
they might suffer) as well as issues for caseworkers and field work. A 
useful line of inquiry we have found is to procure evidence from other 
witnesses which tends to shows that the evidence on which the accused 
was convicted was fabricated. 
In general, several reforms could be introduced to assist in unearthing 
miscarriages of justice. In this context there is the Criminal Justice 
(Forensic Evidence and DNA Database System) Bill 2010 (DNA Bill), 
which is now lapsed and up to the present government to revive. 
Although the DNA Bill is to be welcomed, there are nonetheless flaws 
in it as drafted. Although a majority of the provisions in the DNA Bill 
have been drafted upon the recommendations of a Law Reform 
Commission (L.R.C.) Report on the establishment of the DNA database, 
some do not fully accord with the recommendations in that Report. Most 
importantly, it should be noted that this Report recommended the 
indefinite retention of biological material from a crime scene: “the 
retention is principally as a safeguard in the event that an individual 
convicted of the offence to which the sample relates alleges that a 
miscarriage of justice has occurred and wishes to challenge the veracity 
of the original evidence.”132 However, the DNA Bill is silent on this 
issue. In this context, it is urged that the DNA Bill reflect the need to 
indefinitely preserve biological material found at the crime scene. 
Further, it is tolerably clear that the preservation of evidence remains 
problematic and the procedures in place by the authorities are piecemeal 
at best.133 Thus, on the facts of the aforementioned Conmey, it is evident 
 
 131. D.P.P. v. Connolly, [2003] 2 I.R. 1 (Ir.). 
 132. REPORT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DNA DATABASE, LAW REFORM COMMISSION, 78 
(2005). 
 133. To the best of my knowledge, many Garda preserve, as a matter of practice, all relevant 
evidence until a prisoner is released, but there is no compulsion on them to do so and practices may 
vary. This is in direct contrast to both the U.S. and the U.K. In the latter, the preservation of material 
evidence is governed by the Criminal and Procedure Act 1996 where all material that may be relevant 
must be retained at least until the convicted individual is released from custody. In the U.S., there is the 
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that the authorities may not retain documentary evidence in a manner 
which one would expect, and indeed they may be retained in a manner 
which makes them inaccessible, or in the case of physical or biological 
evidence might render further testing impossible, or irrevocably tainted. 
This is an area which begs regulation and reform. Thus, documentary, 
physical, and other evidential materials must be retained in an 
appropriate manner, and failure to regulate in this area may well negate 
any possibility of exonerating a wrongly convicted person. This is a 
potentially burgeoning area of jurisprudence. 
One final point of particular concern to innocence projects, as 
mentioned, is the need for the Irish courts to evolve a right to post-
conviction testing, as is the practice in all states in the U.S.,134 though it 
is not sanctioned as a federal right as previously mentioned. 
In this context, as was mentioned, the Irish courts could extend the 
principles in Braddish v. DPP,135 where the Supreme Court held that the 
failure to preserve such vital evidence violated the guarantee to fair 
procedures to a right to preserve post-conviction evidence, at least as far 
as a serving prisoner is concerned, within the rubric of Article 38.1, the 
due process clause. 
Thus, as indicated, as far as Irish due process law is concerned, a 
challenge is now in being: which in the final analysis should establish 
(1) the right to post conviction access to evidence. 
(2) the right to post-conviction preservation of evidence and 
(3) the right to post-conviction testing of evidence. 
Whether such prospective challenges before an Irish court will 
succeed is another matter entirely. If such a set of principles were 
established, and we should know in the coming months, the Irish 
Innocence Project will have undertaken a quantum leap in its evolution. 
  
 
Justice for All Act 2004 which allows for greater federal funding for post-conviction DNA testing and, 
hence, has promoted the preservation of material evidence by the State for post-conviction testing. 
 134. All 50 states now endorse the right to post-conviction testing. 
 135. See Braddish v. DPP, [2001] 3 I.R. 127 (Ir.). 
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